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When Sperm Cannot Travel:
Experiences of UK Fertility Patients
Seeking Treatment Abroad
Ilke Turkmendag*
A. Introduction
Assisted reproduction technology (ART) is a term referring to any technique or medical
intervention that enables individuals to procreate, where such procreation would be
unlikely to occur otherwise.1 ART has become an object of legal intervention in many
countries. National restrictions on the availability of ART, and the globalization of health
care services, have expanded the growth of an international market for fertility services.
The practice of travelling abroad to seek access to ART is often referred as ‘reproductive
tourism’. Seeking treatment across borders is a form of medical tourism that enables
patients to take advantage of differences in reproductive consumer cultures reflected in
variations in the cost and availability of treatments, success rates, and waiting lists. The
label ‘tourism’, however, trivializes and obscures the serious issues that underlie cross-
border travel in search of treatment. It may also be seen as a ‘reproductive exile’ where
patients who are denied access to treatment at home try to find a legal regime under
which the treatment they need will be available.2 In the remainder of the chapter, a more
neutral language will be used, and the phenomenon will be referred to as ‘cross-border
reproductive care’ (CBRC) movement, a term suggested by Pennings.3
Although the United Kingdom has some of the most liberal ART regulations in
Europe, increasing numbers of patients seek treatment using donor gametes across the
borders of the European Union (EU). The main reason that drives UK patients abroad
is the donor shortage. The most comprehensive study on CBRC to date was carried out
by European Society of Human Reproduction and Embryology (ESHRE) Task Force
on Cross-Border Reproductive Care, with data from forty six clinics across Europe.
Thirty four per cent of UK resident patients—more than any other nationality within
* This work was supported by a Mildred Blaxter Post Doctoral Fellowship from the Foundation for the
Sociology of Health and Illness. I am grateful to Thérèse Murphy for her thoughtful and detailed insights
about the piece presented here. Many thanks to Mark Flear and to the anonymous referee for their
constructive comments. Finally, I would like to acknowledge all those who gave up their precious time to
be interviewed and to share their experiences with me, and my supervisors Robert Dingwall and Thérèse
Murphy for their endless support during my doctoral work which led to the chapter presented here.
1 ART is often used for infertility treatment. In vitro fertilization (IVF) is the most common ART
treatment and it involves removal of sperm and eggs (gametes) from the couple to produce embryos in the
laboratory. One or more embryos are then transferred to the female partner’s uterus to achieve pregnancy.
2 R Matorras, ‘Reproductive Exile versus Reproductive Tourism’ (2005) 20 Human Reproduction
3571.
3 G Pennings, ‘Reproductive Tourism as Moral Pluralism in Motion’ (2002) 28 Journal of Medical
Ethics 337.
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Europe—cited ‘difficulties accessing treatment’ as their reason for travelling abroad.4
Findings from a recent qualitative study of United Kingdom residents provide further
insights about the access difficulties at home. Overall, ‘a desire for timely and affordable
treatment with donor gametes’ was evident in 71 per cent of cases, making donor
conception the most sought-after treatment amongst these CBRC travellers.5 Most
patients sought treatment within European borders, the most popular destinations
being Spain and the Czech Republic.6
There is now growing concern in the United Kingdom about such CBRCmovement,
but as yet there seems to be little understanding of the extent to which the regulatory
regime may be playing a contributory role. The study presented in this chapter draws on
empirical evidence to encourage more engagement with that question. Drawing on semi-
structured interviews with a group of patients who sought donor conception treatment
across borders, the study discusses the reasons behindCBRCmovement. The accounts of
the patients presented here provide insights about rights and markets, in particular. The
promotion and protection of children’s right to know their genetic identity, a human
rights assumption encouraged by the European Convention onHumanRights (ECHR)7
and now embedded in the United Kingdom’s regulation of donor conception, has
aggravated the donor shortage. And, as we shall see, the implementation of the EU
Tissues and Cells Directive’s (EUTCD)8 voluntary and unpaid donations policy for
tissues and cells has made access to treatment even more difficult.
In what follows, I begin with a brief background to the donor conception regulations
in the United Kingdom. I will then present the views of the UK patients who received
fertility treatment abroad using donated gametes or embryos.
B. Donor Conception and the Law in the United Kingdom
Prior to the 1980s, donor conception was performed without central record-keeping or
regulation.9 In 1982, the UK Government commissioned the Committee of Inquiry
into Human Fertilization and Embryology to report on the ethical and legal issues
associated with assisted conception and related technologies, which led to the Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (HFE Act). Section 31(3) of the HFE Act
allowed children born following anonymous gamete donation to apply for information
about the donor upon reaching the age of 18. The Act did not specify the content of the
information but, in practice, donors were asked to provide some non-identifying infor-
mation, which could be passed to potential recipients. The Code of Practice issued by
the relevant regulatory body, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority
(HFEA), directed that ‘the Act generally permits donors to preserve their anonymity’.10
4 F Shenfield and others, ‘Cross Border Reproductive Care in Six European Countries’ (2010) 25
Human Reproduction 1361.
5 L Culley and others, ‘Crossing Borders for Fertility Treatment: Motivations, Destinations and
Outcomes of UK Fertility Travellers’ (2011) 26 Human Reproduction 2373.
6 Culley (n 5).
7 EuropeanConvention for the Protection ofHumanRights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950, ETS 5.
The ECHR was incorporated into domestic law in the United Kingdom via the Human Rights Act 1998.
8 Directive 2004/23/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on
setting standards of quality and safety for the donation, procurement, testing, processing, preservation,
storage and distribution of human tissues and cells [2004] OJ L102/48.
9 L Frith, ‘Gamete Donation and Anonymity: The Ethical and Legal Debate’ (2001) 16 Human
Reproduction 818.
10 Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority Code of Practice (6th edn) part 5.7.v <www
.hfea.gov.uk/docs/Code_of_Practice_Sixth_Edition.pdf> accessed 21 May 2012. The Code is now in
its 8th edition.
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Towards the end of the 1990s, there was an alarming decrease in the number of
people coming forward as sperm donors in the United Kingdom. Interestingly,
although donor shortage was therefore a growing concern, in 2001, the government
chose to launch a consultation to review the legislation governing access to information
for those conceived through gamete donation.
1. The Child’s Right-to-Know Movement: Rose and Another
v Secretary of State for Health11
The Children’s Society (a national charity involved in campaigning and social policy
work to support children) was the first organization that attempted to transform the
anonymity of donors into a public concern.12 In November 1998, the Society called for
a change in the law so that people who were born by sperm or egg donation could access
the same information about their donors that adopted children could access about their
natural parents. The Society’s call for legal change brought a response from government
agencies: in 1999 the Department of Health confirmed that it was looking at the issue
and would publish a consultation paper. And, although it took a further two years to
start that consultation, the Children’s Society had successfully initiated a controversy.
A few years later another intervention had an impact: this time it was an application
for judicial review by two donor-conceived individuals, Rose and EM. Liberty, a
human rights NGO, announced the case in a press release with the headline ‘Donor
insemination case: children can claim right to personal identity’.13 Rose, an adult
woman and EM, a six-year-old, had both been conceived using donor insemination.14
They had sought access to information about their anonymous sperm donors and also
the introduction of a contact register, but the Secretary of State for Health had rejected
their requests on the ground that a consultation exercise on the issue of anonymity was
already underway. They sought judicial review of this decision, relying on Articles 8
and 14 ECHR. Article 8 provides for a right to respect for private and family life, and
the European Court of Human Rights has held that this right incorporates the concept
of personal identity, including the right to obtain information about a biological
parent.15 The claimants also invoked Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8, arguing
that there should not be discrimination between donor offspring and adoptees or
between donor offspring (like Rose) born before the coming into force of the HFE
Act and those (like EM) born thereafter.
The judge, Scott Baker J, said that he found it ‘entirely understandable that A.I.D.
children should wish to know about their origins’.16 It was in his view quite clear that
Article 8 ECHR and the existing jurisprudence of the European Court of Human
Rights supported the idea that ‘everyone should be able to establish details of his
identity as a human being’, and that this clearly included the ‘right to obtain infor-
mation about a biological parent who will inevitably have contributed to the identity of
his child’.17 Scott Baker J’s judgment says nothing, however, about whether there
11 Rose and Another v Secretary of State for Health [2002] EWHC 1593 (Admin).
12 I Turkmendag, ‘The Donor-conceived Child’s “Right to Personal Identity”: The Public Debate
on Donor Anonymity in the United Kingdom’ (2012) 39 Journal of Law and Society 58.
13 Liberty, Press Release, 26 July 2002 <www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/media/press/2002/donor-
insemination-case-children-can-claim-right-to-personal-identity.php> accessed 21 May 2012.
14 Rose (n 11).
15 See eg Mikulic v Croatia [2002] 1 FCR 720; Odièvre v France [2003] 1 FCR 621.
16 Rose (n 11) [18].
17 Rose (n 11) [47]–[48].
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had been a breach of Article 8 in this case: it focuses only on the fact that Article 8
is engaged. The reason for this is that, at a case management conference prior to the
hearing, the judge had decided that the issue of breach should be ‘stood over’:
Once the consultation exercise was under way, and it was clear that the government was giving
serious consideration to how to tackle this extremely difficult problem, it was obviously sensible
that many of the issues in this litigation should be stood over pending ministerial decisions on
what if any government action was appropriate.18
Ultimately, although Rose and EM’s application for judicial review was successful at
the first stage, the later hearing to determine whether there had in fact been a breach of
Article 8 was delayed and then, in January 2004, the government announced that
donor anonymity was to be lifted. With the implementation of the HFEA (Disclosure
of Donor Information) Regulations 2004, from 1 April 2005, UK law was changed
to allow children born through gamete donation to access identifying details of the
donor.19
Baroness Andrews, speaking in the House of Lords, explained the reasons that made
this change in the law seem so necessary.20 She emphasized that the secrecy and even
stigma surrounding assisted conception had faded; that public attitudes towards infor-
mation and rights to information had changed dramatically (referring to the Rose case);
and that such openness had worked successfully in recent years in relation to adoption.
She argued:
Information now is much more readily accessible than it was in 1991 . . . In a century where
access to information is regarded as a personal and political right, this [donor anonymity] does
not seem any longer to be appropriate. It has already proved to be a bone of contention—the
Government are very likely to be challenged about the provision of information to donor-
conceived people, as the Department of Health has already been in an application brought by
Liberty.21
Rose’s case thus played a significant role in removal of donor anonymity. Although in
English law, disputes about parenthood should be resolved according to the best
interest or welfare principle stated in the Children Act 1989, the Human Rights Act
1998 which incorporated the ECHR into domestic law is also influential.22 Under the
terms of the Human Rights Act, section 3(1), judges must interpret domestic law in a
way which is compatible with Convention rights. As we have seen, Scott Baker J said
that respect for private and family life had been interpreted by the European Court of
Human Rights to incorporate the concept of personal identity; that the concept of
personal identity ‘plainly includes the right to obtain information about a biological
parent who will inevitably have contributed to the identity of his child’; and that in his
judgment there was no great leap in construing Article 8 in this way.23 Following Rose,
then, rejecting right-to-know claims from children who had been born following
gamete donation could have left the UK Government exposed to increasing numbers
of similar cases, backed perhaps by human rights NGOs.
18 Rose (n 11) [16].
19 The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (Disclosure of Donor Information) Regu-
lations 2004, SI 2004/1511.
20 HL Deb, 662 cols 344–8 (2003–4) col 344.
21 HL Deb, 662 cols 344–8 (2003–4) col 344.
22 E Steiner, ‘The Tensions Between Legal, Biological and Social Conceptions of Parenthood in
English Law’ (2006) 10 Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 10.
23 Rose (n 11) [48].
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During the debate in Parliament, some peers stated their concerns about the
potential shortage of eggs and sperm. In other jurisdictions, the removal of anonymity
has generally had a negative impact on both the demand for, and the recruitment of,
gamete donors.24However, Baroness Andrews said that the government was planning a
campaign, costing up to £200,000, to reach out to donors. Moreover, the campaign
would be conducted with the support of three organizations: the National Gamete
Donation Trust, the British Fertility Society, and the Donor Conception Network.
2. Implementation of the EUTCD into UK Law
After the disclosure regulations passed, the Department of Health undertook a public
consultation exercise over the summer and autumn of 2005 on possible changes to
update the HFE Act. The exercise culminated in the Human Fertilisation and Embry-
ology Act 2008, an amending statute. Prior to that, however, the HFE Act was
amended with effect from 5 July 2007 in order to bring the EUTCD into UK law.25
Following the implementation of the EUTCD, the procurement, testing, process-
ing, or distribution of any embryo or sperm and eggs intended for human use must be
licensed by the HFEA or be subject to an agreement with a licensed service.26 If
patients are considering obtaining sperm, eggs, or embryos from within the EU, a
licensed UK clinic can organize for a transfer to be made from that country. However,
the sperm, eggs, or embryos transferred must meet UK requirements. All medical
fertility and non-medical fertility services such as internet sperm providers have to
abide by UK standards, which include all donors being identifiable. There are other
requirements too: donors must have consented to the transfer of their gametes/embryos
to the United Kingdom; they must be made aware of the legal position in the United
Kingdom on identifying donors and the implications of this for donors; and they must
have received no more than reasonable expenses or reimbursement of loss of earnings
(that is, ‘inconvenience’ payments are not permitted).
One effect of the introduction of the EUTCD into UK law is that, although patients
can exercise their rights to travel within the EU to receive gametes or embryos from a
clinic that does not comply with UK standards, the position is different for gametes and
embryos: they cannot travel if they do not meet UK requirements on screening.27
In other words, UK patients cannot get anonymous gametes imported, even if the
gametes were lawfully donated in another Member State of the EU.
Whilst the EU aims to promote a market model, the EUTCD seeks to promote an
altruistic approach to gamete donation: as stated in Article 12, ‘Member States shall
endeavour to ensure that the procurement of tissues and cells as such is carried out on a
non-profit basis.’Having endorsed this principle, and also lifted donor anonymity, UK
24 I Turkmendag, R Dingwall, and T Murphy, ‘The Removal Of Donor Anonymity in The UK:
The Silencing Of Claims By Would-Be Parents’ (2008) 22 International Journal of Law, Policy and the
Family 283.
25 EUTCD (n 8). There are also two supplementary Technical Directives: 2006/17/EC; 2006/
86/EC.
26 HFEA, FAQs about new EU Standards (HFEA 2008) <www.hfea.gov.uk/fertility-clinic-questions-
eu-standards.html> accessed 23 May 2012.
27 Under the directly effective freedom to provide and receive services under Art 56 Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union: R v Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority, ex parte Blood
[1997] 2 All ER 687 (CA). See TK Hervey, ‘Buy Baby: The European Union and Regulation of
Human Reproduction’ (1998) 18 Oxford Journal Legal Studies 207.
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law now offers neither financial incentives nor anonymity to potential donors. And as
we shall see later, this policy of non-anonymous and non-remunerated donation seems
to be part of the reason that would-be parents are heading abroad.
3. The Impact on Access to Treatment
There was a gamete shortage in the United Kingdom prior to the removal of donor
anonymity. Lifting anonymity appears, however, to have exacerbated that shortage.
There were 417 sperm donors in 1996, whereas in 2004, the donor supply had fallen to
228 and it had only recovered slightly by 2008 when it was 284.28 Around this time,
acute donor shortages and long waiting lists for would-be parents were regularly
reported in the media. According to a BBC investigation in 2006, fifty of the
seventy-four clinics in the United Kingdom reported that they had insufficient sperm
or none at all.29 The British Fertility Society claimed that one effect of the change in
legislation was that the cost of donor insemination (DI) had risen enormously in many
centres, and the programme had effectively been removed from the National Health
Service (NHS) as standard practice in most areas.30
Initially the HFEA showed no inclination to review the change in the law. Instead, in
order to try to curb the numbers going abroad, it emphasized ‘risk’. For example, in
April 2006, the then chair of the HFEA, Suzi Leather issued a public statement
warning people against the poorly regulated treatment in overseas clinics. In the
statement Leather referred to those who travel abroad to get treatment as ‘a relatively
small number of people’, and she associated CBRC movement with holiday packages:
We know that a relatively small number of people choose to travel abroad to undergo fertility
treatment and that sometimes the treatment is packaged as a ‘holiday’ where the patient can
convalesce in the sun. However, we are concerned about [sic] people who choose to have their
treatment abroad should know about the potential risks. We have heard of some clinics which
offer treatment to patients that is so dangerous that it has been banned in the UK. . . . It is very sad
when we receive complaints from patients about their treatment abroad and we are not able to
help or reassure them.We would urge patients to think twice and consider the risks and implications
before going abroad for treatment.31
Many would-be parents shared their reactions to this statement on discussion forums
for fertility patients on the internet. Would-be parents are generally well informed
about the success rates, the treatment costs, the methods, and the consultation and
follow-up processes provided by clinics in the United Kingdom and abroad. Not
surprisingly, then, on the discussion forums of the Infertility Network UK there were
patients who expressed the view that the HFEA’s statement was infantilizing.
One year later the HFEA issued a further warning; this one cautioned patients
against buying sperm online. In response to a news report about women purchasing
sperm through the internet, the new chair of the HFEA, Professor Lisa Jardine, began
28 S Norcross, ‘HFEA Publishes New Sperm and Egg Donor Figures’ (Bionews 519 2009) <www
.bionews.org.uk/page_46313.asp> accessed 8 May 2012.
29 BBC News, ‘Figures from Scotland’s IVF Clinics’ (BBC News 2006) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/
hi/scotland/5065050.stm> accessed 23 May 2012.
30 British Fertility Society, British Fertility Society Response to the White Paper on the Human
Fertilization and Embryology Act (2007) <www.fertility.org.uk/news/documents/Final%20BFS%
20response%20to%20White%20paper%2024.4.07.pdf> accessed 23 May 2012.
31 S Leather, ‘Press Release: Thinking of Going Abroad? Think Twice About Going Abroad for
Fertility Treatment’ (HFEA 2006) <www.hfea.gov.uk/632.html> accessed 23 May 2012. Emphasis
added.
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by emphasizing that it was a criminal offence to ‘procure, test, process or distribute’ any
gametes (sperm and eggs) intended for human application without a licence from the
Authority. She went on to say that would-be parents seeking donated gametes ‘should
only use licensed centres’:
That way, they can be assured that the gametes have been subject to screening checks and that the
centre complies with the standards set out in the HFEA code of practice. A further difficulty with
using unlicensed centres is that the HFEA is unable to hold, in its statutory registers, information
relating to donors or children conceived from gametes obtained from such centres.32
She then returned to the question of criminality:
Responsibility for prosecuting criminal offences rests with the police, and it is the practice of the
HFEA to refer concerns about internet procurement to them. We strongly advise any person who
becomes aware that a person or organization may be procuring, testing, processing or distributing
gametes without a licence to contact the police. The women whose stories you tell are entitled to
make such fundamental choices about their personal lives within a safe, clinically sound
framework. It is the HFEA’s responsibility to provide that framework, and to be vigilant for
the safety of those who undergo fertility treatment. The internet sperm providers referred to in
one of your examples are not licensed by the HFEA. The service they offer is unlawful and unsafe.
Two years later, in 2010, two men were convicted of running a fertility website,
without a licence, selling sperm from anonymous donors to women trying to conceive.
They each received a nine-month custodial sentence, suspended for two years, a
£15,000 fine, and 200 hours of unpaid work, and were banned from future work in
the industry. Nearly 800 women, however, had signed up to use the online service
provided by the men’s company, which had operated under various names including
Sperm Direct Limited and First4Fertility.33
Fertility travel, internet sperm providers, and the grey market in gametes are
phenomena addressed as ‘unsafe’, ‘illegal’, and unethical’, respectively, by policy-
makers. And, as we have seen, would-be parents have been warned against the conse-
quences of considering any solution to their infertility, other than treatment in a
licensed UK clinic. Far less, however, has been said about the reasons would-be parents
seek out ‘coping’ or ‘avoidance’ strategies or how solutions might be found to the
problems that lead such parents to use ‘illegitimate’ ways of obtaining gametes.
C. CBRC Movement From the Patients’ Perspective
The interviews and the data analysis presented here draw on my PhD work
which explored the reactions of patients to the removal of donor anonymity in the
United Kingdom. The people whose views are presented are a sub-group of patients who
received/or considered receiving fertility treatment abroad: for the most part I refer to
them as ‘would-be parents’. The data was collected by thirteen semi-structured qualita-
tive interviews.34 The interviews themselves assessed three areas of the donor-conception
32 L Jardine, ‘Internet sperm providers are illegal’ (Guardian News and Media Limited 2008) <www
.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/sep/23/ukcrime.law1> accessed 23 May 2012.
33 The Independent, ‘Two spared jail over illegal sperm business’ (The Independent 2010) <www
.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/two-spared-jail-over-illegal-sperm-business-2104324.html>
accessed 8 May 2012.
34 Of the thirteen individuals interviewed, five were egg recipients, two were embryo recipients, one
was a sperm recipient, one contracted a surrogate mother as well as donating eggs, one was an egg
donor, and one was a sperm donor.
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – REVISES, 12/12/2012, SPi
368 Ilke Turkmendag
Comp. by: PG2689 Stage : Revises1 ChapterID: 0001797201 Date:12/12/12 Time:12:56:56
Filepath:d:/womat-filecopy/0001797201.3D369
experience: first, the decision-making process; secondly, disclosure; and, thirdly, claims-
making (both for and against policy change). Ethical concerns relating to informed
consent, the right to privacy, and protection from harm were carefully considered both
before and after the interviews.
In what follows, the themes that emerged from the interviews will be presented in
five main sections: disclosure; donor shortage; rights; markets; and policymaking.
1. Disclosure: ‘Being Forced to Tell’
During the donor anonymity debate in the public sphere, the view that donor-
conceived children have a right to have access to identifiable information was legitim-
ized by two principal claims. First, the position of donor-conceived people should be
aligned more closely with that of adopted people, with access to identifying information
about their donor.35 Secondly, as studies on adopted children had shown, genealogical
knowledge is necessary for the development of identity; by denying access to their
donor’s identity, the government infringes the human rights of donor-conceived
children.36 During the donor anonymity debate that led to the 2004 regulations,
these claims were part of broader emphasis on openness and transparency—an
emphasis that was not just strong but almost intimidating. For example, any inclination
towards secrecy on the part of donor-conception families was portrayed as a potential
threat to the resultant child’s welfare; indeed, parents who intended not to disclose were
accused of deception and violation of moral standards.37 Similarly the HFEA advised
would-be parents that ‘[i]t is certainly best to be open with your child/children about the
circumstances of their conception. Secrecy on this subject isn’t in their interests and they
will have a right to find out about their origins from our register when they reach 18’.38
Such imposition of disclosure presupposes that there is one way of organizing family life
and that transparency will and should work for every family.39 In the next section, I use
interview data to show the reactions of would-be parents to this disclosure discourse
that asserts openness.
a. ‘The information, once it is out, you can’t get it back’
Parents who choose not to disclose may justify their non-disclosure on the ground that
it protects the best interests of the child. In the first extract, Lindsay reflects on her
views about the disclosure. Lindsay, who had a daughter, Sandy, as a result of embryo
donation, told her ‘you came in a different way, you are special’. Sandy is now four
years old. Lindsay still struggles about how to manage the information about Sandy’s
origins:
I am struggling . . . that is, you know I have told people information that is basically Sandy’s
information and that is where I have the dilemma. Because she is not old enough to know who
she would like to tell, and who she would not like to tell. And I am doing it on her behalf . . . And
35 Turkmendag (n 12).
36 Turkmendag (n 12).
37 Turkmendag (n 12).
38 HFEA, ‘For Parents of Donor-Conceived Children’ (HFEA 2008) <www.hfea.gov.uk/en/1185
.html> accessed August 2008. Emphasis added. The content of the web page has been updated since.
39 G Pennings, ‘The “Double Track” Policy for Donor Anonymity’ (1997) 12Human Reproduction
2839.
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the information, once it is out you can’t get it back. That is the reason that I keep cautious, not
anything to do with me but because she might not want anyone to know.
Alice has a similar dilemma about revealing the information about her twins’ origins.
Alice got pregnant using her late husband’s frozen sperm and donor eggs. She notes that
her twins might have trouble with the fact that their father passed away before they
were born. Therefore, she wants to wait for the right time before telling the children
about their means of origin. She expresses concern that if the egg donation is known,
she cannot avoid her children being bullied at school by other kids. Hence, she has
shared her treatment only with immediate family and close friends.
Lindsay and Alice regard the information about the donor-conceived child’s origins as
the child’s own information. They are therefore reluctant to pass this information to
other people on their child’s behalf. They also express concern about a child’s competence
in managing the information. Young children may be eager to share the details of their
origins at a young age. But once they start to realize the content of the information that
they have been sharing with everyone, they might feel that they have made a mistake.
These parents are concerned not to give the child greater autonomy ‘at any cost’.
b. ‘Being dictated what you have to tell the child, it doesn’t seem
right to me.’
Some participants considered that the disclosure policy discriminates against donor-
conception families by comparison with those with naturally conceived children who
do not necessarily know their origins. People who conceive naturally (but, for example,
as a result of an affair or a one-night stand) are not told what to tell to their children.
Fiona points out that the government does not intervene in other areas of family life
and does not tell people how to bring up their children. She stresses that she is doubly
discriminated against: nature has discriminated against her, and now it is the policy-
makers who remind her that she is different.
The government don’t intervene in other areas of family life. They don’t tell people what they must
tell their children or how theymust bring themup. So when you are already had such a battle, by the
time we get another donor now and if we go through a cycle of successful we will be been trying for a
child for nine years. Now, that itself is hard enough and put an enormous strain on a relationship, as
well. Being dictated what you have to tell the child, it doesn’t seem right to me . . .Nature already
discriminated against me and it feels like the law was written that way as well.40
Fiona and her husband have been foster parents to nine children; none of these children
knew who their genetic father was. Thus, for Fiona, the disclosure policy is not only
discriminatory against those who use donor conception, but also against the resultant
children. Her foster children do not know who their fathers are, because their mothers
were not encouraged to be open about their means of conception:
We had nine foster children and in every single case none of them have known their genetic
father. They have all been a result of one-night stands or short relationships and the government
isn’t there, telling these mums that they have to provide their children with genetic background
so . . . I can’t help feeling a bit discriminated against. The young girls that we’ve got fostering at
the moment they have no dads, there is six children in their family from the same mum with six
different dad. Not one of them knows their dad and you know, their mum isn’t forced to reveal
anything to them, or even tell them the names of their dads or anything. And they know nothing
40 Emphasis added.
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about their background on their paternal side. So I do feel a bit sort of preached to be told that
I have to tell any resultant children . . . At least mine are wanted children and they are gonna be
brought up in a stable mother and father relationship unlike the foster children we have.41
In the following extract, Tina talks about family-building practices before the arrival of
ARTs. She says that in the past, if one wanted a child, one could have an affair, and this
would be unspoken. She points out that the removal of anonymity does not apply to
people like her husband’s ex-wife, who got pregnant as a result of an affair:
in 1960s or something . . . It was an unspoken thing, if you found out that the man had a
problem, then the woman turned to see . . . She went off, had a little fling. Cause in those days
you would expect a baby in a year. You would wonder how many women just go out . . . and men
knew it . . . sort of . . . didn’t say anything.
Some of participants suggested that the new disclosure policy may be increasing
subterfuge rather than openness. For example, Fiona argued that the disclosure policy
makes her ‘rebellious’ against openness. She would be more positive about disclosure if
she were not ‘forced’. Although under the current legislation she is not compelled to tell
her donor-conceived child about its origins, Fiona feels that she is ‘dictated’, ‘forced’,
and ‘preached to’ about disclosure:
I am not against it [disclosure]. I do think it is child’s best interest to tell, I really do but that’s an
intellectual decision not an emotional decision as regards actually telling the child. If we are lucky
enough to have one in the future, I hope I will, but I know that I would be really worried about
telling, and I certainly don’t like being forced to tell. I also think that we would come around to
that conclusion a lot quicker if we weren’t forced to tell. We would estimate that decision as good
sensible parents. I think we would come to the right answer but being forced to tell sort of makes
me back away, you know, makes me want to do the opposite, makes me feel a bit rebellious
as well.42
Alice proposes that, instead of lifting anonymity, the HFEA could provide a detailed
profile of the donor without giving identifying information. She claims that donor-
conceived children will be satisfied with knowing about the characteristics of the donor;
they do not necessarily need to know the identity of the donor:
Again going back to the whole child’s right to know thing, I think there are ways of
disclosing information without necessarily giving away the donors identity because I really
wonder whether . . . it would make any difference to children who were born with donor egg or
sperm to know who their donor is as oppose to the characteristics of about their donor.
The interview accounts show that these participants are not convinced that
disclosing the means of conception is in the best interests of the child. These
parents feel that maintaining secrecy, or limiting information, about the child’s
conception is the safest way to protect the child, themselves, and the extended family.
The accounts also suggest that the disclosure policy in the United Kingdom creates a
socio-legal environment that requires donor-conception families to display their differ-
ences from other families.
As Smart explains, however, nowadays there is an almost unquestionable presump-
tion that it is best for children to know identifiable information about the gamete donor
who played a role in their conception, and increasingly this welfare criterion is also
linked to a rights-based argument.43 For example, in Re T (A Child) (DNA Tests:
41 Emphasis added. 42 Emphasis added.
43 C Smart, ‘Law and the Regulation of Family Secrets’ (2010) 24 International Journal of Law,
Policy and the Family 397.
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Paternity) the judge decided that the child in question had a right to respect for private
life under Article 8 ECHR in the sense of having knowledge of his identity which also
encompasses his true paternity. Smart is critical of the new enthusiasm about knowing
the truth:
The tendency for public policy, with its enthusiasm for DNA testing, to assume that (genetic)
truth is better than (relational) fiction means that the addition of more genetic kin through these
means is inevitably seen as producing a positive outcome for children (and possibly for adults).
Yet children live in webs of relationships that are delicately interconnected and adding more
relatives may disrupt and even break some of these links.44
She also gives an example of a recent ruling where the disclosure of paternity meant that
the child in question would have lost more kin (a putative paternal grandmother who
was his significant carer, a putative half-sibling, and a cousin) than he would have
gained (a genetic father who was a stranger to the child).45 In this case, the child did not
want to know the truth: not knowing would mean that he could keep his grandmother,
his brother, and cousin, and remain living with them rather than living with his genetic
father.
Smart’s analysis of the case reminds us that not everyone in family relationships is
necessarily going to see genetic truth as an unassailable guiding principle. The interview
accounts presented in the following section echo this view.
2. Donor Shortage: ‘Throwing Out the Baby with the Bath Water’
The would-be parents in my study were clear that the shortage of donors could be
attributed to the new disclosure law. Rosie claimed that lifting anonymity has had a
negative effect on donor recruitment in the United Kingdom. She compared the
programme in the United Kingdom to that in Spain, arguing that the latter is successful
because the donors are able to preserve their anonymity:
They say it [removal of donor anonymity] doesn’t have any effect but I can’t see how it doesn’t.
I mean I—I am sure it will. It is logical and I am sure the programme in Spain would not be so
successful, let’s say if the donors were not anonymous. I think that they want to be anonymous.
I don’t think they want to be known or want to be contacted.
Alice also took the view that the removal of donor anonymity had caused a reduction in
donations. She claimed that the open donation system in the United Kingdom
frightens donors, as the resultant child might contact them in the future:
how can you not equate the two? The removal donor anonymity will of course cause a huge
deduction in donors who want to come forward, of course that will scare people and they are not
going to want to donate. People who donate sperm have done it in past are frightened. People
who egg share or donate sperm all have done so in the past are frightened, majority of them are. In
18 years past time this adult can come to the door step, say ‘you are my genetic father and
mother’, that’s why.
Alice had travelled to Spain and Poland, countries that allow the treatment she needed
(to get pregnant using an embryo created by insemination of her late husband’s frozen
sperm using donor eggs). She could have received the treatment in the United
Kingdom, but she did not want to wait for eggs. In Alice’s view it is the removal of
donor anonymity and the long waiting lists that drive people abroad:
44 (n 43) 409. 45 Re D (paternity) [2007] 2 FLR 26.
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It is difficult because you know I can see what they are trying to doing but I just wonder, you
know, whether, sorry to use this but throwing out the baby with the bath water really, because it
is driving people abroad . . . People are not willing to wait and you know 30s, 40s . . . they are not
going to wait a couple of years. They take the best option . . . going to Spain, Russia or Poland
where there aren’t any waiting lists, cost is not a problem.
For a majority of participants in my study, waiting was not an option. One participant,
Tina, who received embryo donation, was in her early forties and had a chance of using
her own eggs to conceive. However, after a few failed attempts with IVF, she did not
want to try to conceive with her own eggs any longer. She feared that the procedure
would be time-consuming, risking her chances of carrying a baby. Another participant,
Rosie, felt a need to start her treatment immediately—her age gave her no other choice:
‘I didn’t want to wait any longer I wanted to get on with it.’
Infertility increases by age. The participants in this study who considered donor eggs
were between 30 and 40 years old. Because age is a significant determinant of the
effectiveness of treatment, they gave up using their own gametes after failed attempts in
their early forties, yet they were then faced with long waiting lists in the United
Kingdom. Crossing borders was, they believed, the only option available to them if
they wanted to become parents.
The United Kingdom’s donor shortage is also an obstacle for couples who want to
receive donations from a donor with a physical resemblance to them. Clinics situated in
countries where abundant supplies of gametes are available often promise to match the
physical characteristics of the donors with those of the would-be parents. A brief review
of the postings on message boards on the internet indicates that, by contrast, clinics in
the United Kingdom avoid making such promises.46 Accordingly, a would-be parent
may need to travel abroad in order to find a donor with a reasonable match to their own
physical characteristics, or those of their partner. One of the reasons that motivated
Rosie and her partner to get treatment in Spain was the likelihood of finding a donor
who resembled their physical appearance.
I am not actually English racially. I am actually Jewish, Polish Jewish and my partner is quite dark
skinned . . . and we are not very tall . . . so we thought actually Spain is pretty good for us anyway
in terms of matching. So I didn’t look anywhere else.
Having a donor with physical similarities provides would-be parents with biological
continuity.47 There is a cultural expectation that children resemble their parents; thus,
having a child that resembles oneself reduces the level of ‘cognitive dissonance’ that
social parents experience.
3. Markets: The Commercial Side of the CBRC Movement
This section deals with payment to donors and helps us to understand how the
participants in my study presented the commercial side of CBRC movement. Trade
in gametes is driven by two imperatives: the need for infertility treatment, and the need
for stem cell research.48 Women are the primary providers of such reproductive
material but, at least in the EU context, the economic value of their labour remains
46 Turkmendag, Dingwall, and Murphy (n 24).
47 G Becker, The Elusive Embryo: How Women and Men Approach New Reproductive Technologies
(University of California Press 2000).
48 C Waldby, ‘Oocyte Markets: Women’s Reproductive Work in Embryonic Stem Cell Research’
(2008) 27 New Genetics and Society 19.
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largely unacknowledged.49 Reproductive tissue is constituted as a ‘gift’ from the ‘donor’
to the recipient. For example, Recital 18 of the EUTCD asserts: ‘tissue and cell
programmes should be founded on the philosophy of voluntary and unpaid donation,
anonymity of both donor and recipient, altruism of the donor and solidarity between
donor and recipient.’50 According to Article 12(1) of the EUTCD on standards relating
to the handling and use of human tissues and cells, ‘[d]onors may receive compen-
sation, which is strictly limited to making good the expenses and inconveniences related
to the donation.’
There are, as Waldby explains, both pros and cons of the gift system: whilst it
prevents commodification of human bodily material, it often means that donors are
simply treated as open sources of bodily material that can be profitably privatized by
biotechnology companies. She argues that although it would contravene the prevailing
European ethos opposing the commodification of the human body, it might be worth
considering provision of reproductive tissues and cells as a form of labour.51 As we shall
see, the views expressed by the would-be parents in this study are similar; they consider
donation (eggs in particular) as a form of labour that deserves incentives, a view that
runs contrary to the EUTCD’s non-profit donation system.
a. The United Kingdom’s non-remunerative donation policy:
‘I would get them paid’
There are wide discrepancies in how the gift system is interpreted across EU Member
States. The UK policy makes sure that donors do not have financial gain from
donating: donors are compensated for expenses and loss of earnings, but not for
inconvenience. When the interviews were conducted, the amount an egg donor
could claim for loss of earnings was up to a daily maximum of £63.12, with an overall
limit of £250 per donation cycle. In many other EU countries there is a blanket fee for
loss of earnings, expenses, and inconvenience. For example in Spain, egg donors are
compensated by up to € 900.52 In the following extract, Rosie says that such payment is
not ‘huge’ enough to encourage people to donate repeatedly:
I think it is good that they pay people [in Spain]. I mean they don’t get a huge amount of money.
It is only like seven or 800 Euros or something. Having been through IVF I mean, I don’t think it
is a lot of money because it is quite you know, quite a heavy process to go through. I know that
they are ok, they get paid but it is not a big amount.
Rosie points out that she is comfortable with the idea of egg donors being paid, because
then she can see the process as a ‘business arrangement’. She thinks that for a student,
for example, this is ‘not a bad way of earning some money’. Rosie’s account also
indicates that the donors deserve to be paid for providing eggs which is a ‘quite heavy
process’. Similarly, Tina, too, draws attention to the difficulties of donating eggs. She
thinks that egg donors should be paid, because unlike sperm donation, egg donation is
not easy:
In Spain you pay woman 600 pounds. It is a cultural thing. It is not nice having been through it.
You wouldn’t keep doing it. For men it is easy.
Another participant, Alison, supports the open donation system, yet she expresses
concern about the decreasing donor numbers and the long waiting lists. She says that
49 ibid. 50 EUTCD (n 8). 51 Waldby (n 48).
52 HFEA, ‘HFEA FAQs for Donors’ (HFEA 2012) <www.hfea.gov.uk/2627.html#2640> accessed
8 May 2012.
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we expect too much of the donors: they are identifiable, and they only get their travel
expenses paid. Like the other participants, Alison states that she would like egg donors
to get paid.
I had mixed feelings because I would choose an identifiable donor but obviously it means that the
supply is greatly reduced so it is tricky. If it was up to me, I would I’d leave the identified part, but
I’d like them get paid.
Unlike sperm, eggs are not a self-renewing, copious, and accessible tissue, and they are
never detached from the body in the normal course of events.53 Donating eggs involves
stimulating the ovaries and the multiple follicles, shutting down the donor’s reproduct-
ive cycle, several hormone injections, and then a surgical procedure to retrieve the eggs.
The participants had an understanding of all of this; they were familiar with the
complexity of IVF procedures (and some had been involved in egg sharing). Many of
them expressed the view that egg donation was not an easy process and that egg donors
should be paid for their efforts. The participants did not think that payment would
cause abuse; the amount paid would not be high enough, they said, to encourage
people to go through this procedure repeatedly.
b. Standards of the clinics abroad: ‘Why don’t we go, it is in Barcelona, we like
Barcelona, it is a nice place you know’
By making both international partnerships and patient bookings much easier, internet
communication has facilitated the growth of CBRC.54 All of the participants in my
study had made use of the internet. For example, when Rosie needed egg donation, she
started doing research about the procedure and found a website called IVF Connec-
tions. She read the postings on message boards and found out that success rates were
high in Spain, especially in one clinic in Barcelona:
just reading the stuff from the board at that time. Everyone seemed to be successful, That was
really incredible. It was just like very good feeling . . . so many people were getting pregnant and
so basically I thought about it. If all these women try that, what’s so special about me that
I couldn’t consider it? Why don’t we go, it is in Barcelona, we like Barcelona, it is a nice place you
know, go and have a consultation and I heard that they were very quick and the indication of the
cost that was a concern but I was lucky. I had enough money to do it . . .
Alice is content with the treatment she received in Spain and Poland. She says that the
consultation process is more open and advanced in comparison to the consultation
provided in the United Kingdom. Moreover, the cost of the treatment is lower abroad:
What I experienced in Poland and Spain, compared to clinics here, they have more experience.
The doctors are out there, [they] are willing to take time to talk to you. . . . In Poland you decide
how many embryos can be implanted, they talk to you. This is our recommendation, you can
have 2 or 3 . . . Even it is in different country you have their e-mails. I have the mobile number of
the doctor . . . In cost of one treatment in this country I can have two treatments.
Some patients expressed ethical concerns around the services provided by United
Kingdom clinics. Tina had embryo donation in Spain. She stressed that donor ano-
nymity was the main reason that drove her abroad, but she also commented on her
other motives. She started her treatment in the United Kingdom in a private clinic.
When they found out that they could not conceive due to male factor infertility, Tina
53 Waldby (n 48). 54 Waldby (n 48).
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and her husband decided to receive sperm donation. However, they were advised to get
intra-cytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI) instead, which would enable Tina to get
pregnant using her husband’s sperm. Given that ICSI is much more expensive
than sperm donation, and more complicated, Tina did not take the clinicians’ advice.
When she heard from a friend that the success rate was only 5 per cent for her age
group, she decided that the clinic was giving her false hope and her treatment was a
waste of time. She thinks that private clinicians have business minds and, when money
comes into the equation, their advice is not reliable:
In the beginning when we found out that it was him [my husband] we asked for DI. They said
no, you must have ICSI. DI is for 500 pounds, ICSI is 5500. Lord Winston said when money
comes to the equation, ethics go out the door. With donor sperm you have a straight insemin-
ation, 10% chance, it is not that great but it was . . . and they said no . . . your husband has some
sperm and you must try to have your husband’s child.
Tina and her husband finally decided to get treatment in Spain using anonymous
frozen embryos. The clinic staff in the United Kingdom warned Tina against getting
treatment abroad. They thought the clinic in Spain was not ethical:
My clinic here in England took an extremely poor view of me going to Spain . . . questioned the
ethics and the professionalism of the clinic in Spain. They completely, you know, put a down
view on the whole thing.
Despite the concerns raised by the clinicians, for Tina the advantages of undergoing
treatment in Spain were obvious: the clinics were more advanced, there were donors
available, anonymity was preserved, and there were no waiting lists.
In Spain, they are bigger. Their equipment is the latest thing. In England it is all rubbish, you
wait for hours and you spend the same money, the same cost. . . . I would have done here, which
you can’t. There is no donor egg available. . . . And if you have one, you have to tell the child.
Waiting lists are five years. At my age you couldn’t wait. In Spain there is no waiting list.
The accounts quoted here indicate that the participants in the study consider the
standards of infertility treatment in other EU countries to be as high, if not better, than
those in the United Kingdom. Given that the cost of such services is approximately the
same or less than the ones provided in the United Kingdom, and that by going abroad
one can avoid the waiting lists at home, it should come as no surprise that growing
numbers of patients seek treatment in other EU countries.
4. Policymaking: The HFEA and the Reproductive ‘Tourism’
During the interviews some of the participants referred to the ways in which the HFEA
had dealt with CBRCmovement. Alice, for example, described the HFEA as being ‘like
an ostrich’, burying its head in the ground. She did not think the Authority represented
patients’ opinions in its decisions. And she said that, in the absence of statistics
revealing the number of people seeking treatment abroad, the HFEA will continue
denying the facts.
There is so much opportunity going on at this moment. The way HFEA operates today, their
statistics not include anyone who has gone abroad for treatment. So that’s just completely not
part of research to them, ‘oh no one is going abroad for treatment, you know because we are not
doing the research in that area anyway’.
Alice wondered how the HFEA would respond to statistics revealing a decrease in
donor numbers following the removal of donor anonymity. Alice also expressed the
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – REVISES, 12/12/2012, SPi
376 Ilke Turkmendag
Comp. by: PG2689 Stage : Revises1 ChapterID: 0001797201 Date:12/12/12 Time:12:56:56
Filepath:d:/womat-filecopy/0001797201.3D377
view that the HFEA was responsible for the consequences of the donor anonymity
policy, and the donor shortage, and that the Authority was not listening to the voices of
would-be parents who were being driven abroad. Alice’s account suggests that going
abroad is not the patients’ choice; but ‘their [the HFEA’s] making’. For Alice, CBRC
movements are the end-result of policymaking that is not informed by the views of
would-be parents:
And I see a couple of programmes where they have interviewed Suzi Leather. She’s just said ‘if
people want to go abroad that’s their issue, we don’t look at clinics abroad we look at clinics from
UK’. I am thinking yes, but it is actually your making that driving them abroad, you know and
there is no recognition of that. No understanding. It is a bit like, the HFEA is like an ostrich,
buried in the ground . . .Who represents the patients in these big decisions that they make? Is
there anyone? Not that I know of . . . So I have mixed feelings about them.
The would-be parents also reacted to Leather’s remark that fertility treatment was
marketed as a holiday. Like many other would-be parents who sent their protests to
online support groups, Tina stressed that infertility treatment is not a holiday.
You want a baby, the media made out this whole fertility tourism thing ‘yeah, you go on holiday
and have your treatment’ and it is like ‘yeah you get to go to a different place and some Spain or
whatever’. But it is not a holiday, there are so much going on in your body in your mind, you
know.
Alice stated that policymakers should have weighed the cost of lifting anonymity for
would-be parents. Alice feels that having access to a donor’s identity and being told
about donor conception are different matters, and she is uncertain as to whether
knowing the identity of the donor would make a big difference to the donor-conceived
child. Disclosure policy, she thinks, is preventing couples from being parents:
Although I can understand, you know, for a child it is important to know what the background
is, it is not possible in some families, even in natural families, and you have to weight out what the
cost of removal of donor anonymity would be. It may make a difference, it may not. Look how
many couples left in the situation, who want to be parents, left in the situation where they have to
wait long periods. . . . I know we all want to our children best we can, but almost preventing
couples to have the opportunity of becoming parents . . . It is a tricky one. For me personally, I am
a bit biased, coming from the point that I have donor egg I would say the disclosure policy is not
the best policy that HFEA came up with.
The would-be parents in this study saw the donor shortage as a direct consequence of
the removal of donor anonymity, and they blamed the HFEA for the circumstances
that ‘oblige’ them to seek treatment abroad. The fact that obtaining treatment abroad
had been condemned by the HFEA was a cause of further frustration. The parents
also expressed the view that their concerns were not taken into consideration by the
HFEA. This suggests very strongly that further research examining the communication
gap between such stakeholders and the HFEA would contribute to developing strat-
egies that could, and should, inform policymaking.
On a positive note, the HFEA’s approach does seem to be changing. In August
2010, in part because of concern regarding the numbers opting to go to countries such
as Spain and Cyprus to receive gametes, the Authority launched a full public consult-
ation into sperm and egg donation policies. In this consultation document, the HFEA
noted that the landscape of donation had changed since the Authority looked at these rules
in 2005, and it emphasized that it would like to make sure that the rules are up to date. It
also expressed concern that some fertility centres overseas may offer substandard treat-
ment, and that increasing numbers of people are purchasing unscreened sperm on the
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internet.55 It asked if gamete supply could be improved by a change in policy, or
withdrawal from commitments under the EUTCD.56
As a result of the consultation process, the HFEA decided to take a more proactive
approach to donor recruitment, and increased the compensation amount that sperm
and egg donors should be permitted.57 Egg donors can now receive £750 per cycle of
donation. Sperm donors can receive a £35 fee per individual visit. The donors remain
non-anonymous, however.
D. Discussion
The removal of anonymity has had identifiable detrimental effects in the United
Kingdom: donors are reluctant to donate; clinics cannot meet the demand for gametes;
and there are long waiting lists for patients who wish to get treatment. Why then have
would-be parents been reluctant to mobilize against it? It is argued here that this
reluctance may reflect the variety of ways in which they can avoid the impact of the
change in the law: CBRC, in particular, acts as a safety valve.
It has been argued that CBRC promotes moral pluralism; that it prevents the
potential clash between minorities wishing to use ART, and majorities who place
restrictions on these practices.58 Others, however, see CBRC as a poor substitute for
moral pluralism.59 In fact, as Storrow argues, CBRC’s function as a safety valve against
organized resistance at home is precisely what enables national legislatures to introduce
restrictive regulations limiting access to reproductive care: governments may feel
justified in assuming a stricter position than they otherwise might, knowing that
CBRC will temper resistance to the law.60 Arguably, then, diversity between different
EU Member States has enabled the United Kingdom to introduce restrictive laws with
regard to donor recruitment and the procurement of gametes. However, crossing
borders to seek treatment in other jurisdictions is hardly desirable for patients: indeed,
the interview accounts presented here suggest that such ‘reproductive exile’ may add to
the stigmatization of infertility.61 In addition, as Robertson notes, CBRC as a solution
‘is grossly unfair because it enables only those with funds to escape the law’s strictures.
Those who are able to travel to obtain services must also bear the additional burdens of
being away from home for substantial periods, making the already psychologically
fraught and stressful situation of infertility all the more difficult.’62
Irish abortion policy is another example of an approach to the regulation of
reproduction ‘where a government “chooses” to facilitate these services through “dele-
gation and doubt”’.63 In Ireland abortion is only permissible when there is a risk to the
55 HFEA, A Review of the HFEA’s Sperm and Egg Donation Policies (HFEA 2011) <www.hfea.gov
.uk/docs/2011-01 13_Donation_review_background.pdf> accessed 23 May 2012.
56 E Blyth, ‘Gamete Donation Review: Not the HFEA’s Finest Hour’ (Bionews 605, 2011) <www
.bionews.org.uk/page_94012.asp> accessed 23 May 2012.
57 S Starr, ‘HFEA Takes First Set of Decisions Following Donation Review’ (BioNews 616, 2011)
<www.bionews.org.uk/page_102199.asp> accessed 8 May 2012.
58 Pennings (n 3).
59 Pennings (n 3).
60 RF Storrow, ‘The Pluralism Problem in Cross-border Reproductive Care’ (2010) Human
Reproduction 2939.
61 JA Robertson, ‘Protecting Embryos and Burdening Women: Assisted Reproduction in Italy’
(2004) 19 Human Reproduction 1693.
62 Robertson (n 61) 1696.
63 See M Fox and T Murphy, ‘Irish Abortion: Seeking Refuge in a Jurisprudence of Doubt and
Delegation’ (1992) 19 Journal of Law and Society 454.
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pregnant woman’s life. According to the Irish Family Planning Association, between
January 1980 and December 2010, at least 147,912 women travelled from the
Republic of Ireland for safe abortion services abroad.
Having been through reproductive ‘exile’ in order to terminate their pregnancies, in
2005, three Irish women challenged Ireland’s abortion law at the European Court of
Human Rights.64 The applicants felt that their rights under Articles 2, 3, 8, and 14 of
the ECHR had been breached.65 The Court ruled that the Article 8 rights of all three
applicants were engaged. However, it distinguished the situation of A and B (who
sought abortion for health and/or well-being reasons) from C (who sought abortion as
she felt that the pregnancy posed a risk to her life) and ruled that Ireland’s abortion law
violated applicant C’s rights under Article 8 ECHR. The Court also decided that the
Irish Government needed to implement an infrastructure to facilitate legal abortions
within the jurisdiction, that is, where the woman’s life is at risk.66 Ultimately, however,
the decision did not lead to any liberalization of Irish law on abortion: as McGuinness
notes, the Court facilitated Ireland’s restrictive abortion laws through its application of
the ‘margin of appreciation’ doctrine. The Court considered, first, that abortion could
not be disentangled from the question of when life begins; an issue on which there is no
consensus in Europe.67 Secondly, the judgment did not try to widen the category of
cases when abortion would be legal in Ireland as it considered this to be a highly
sensitive and controversial issue for the Irish public.68
The Court’s decision also suggests that it does not see the risks created by the Irish
abortion ban as a human rights issue. The ban risks women’s health by causing
abortions to be performed later than is necessary, and creates emotional upset for
women at an already stressful time.69 Moreover, as noted earlier, crossing borders to
receive medical help is not an option for everyone. In Ireland, both illegal abortions,
and the use of illegal abortion pills have become a necessity for women who cannot
travel abroad to end their pregnancies. McGuinness argues: ‘[W]ould the Irish Gov-
ernment’s “choice”’ to deal with abortion through allowing the provision of infor-
mation and travel when travel is not possible still fail to breach Article 8 rights?’70
The Court’s reluctance to engage deeply with Irish abortion law suggests that
European human rights law does not place limits on the power of strongly held
moral views in Member States of the Council of Europe. This is problematic because,
in a democratic society, because of the fundamental nature of the rights at stake in
issues related to human reproduction, majoritarian sentiments should not override the
interests of major stakeholders of the problem, even though they are in a minority.71
Besides, it is questionable whether the Irish abortion ban reflects the Irish public’s
view on the matter. According to McGuinness, in A, B and C the judgment was
influenced by the Irish Government’s insertion of ‘anti-abortion’ clauses in the Maas-
tricht and Lisbon Treaties, which in fact, indicate a fear that ‘Europeanization’ could
lead to abortion being forced on the Irish people, rather than reflecting a majoritarian
attitude on abortion.72 Similarly, the removal of donor anonymity had little to do with
public attitudes on donor conception in the United Kingdom: prior to the removal of
64 A, B and C v Ireland [2010] ECHR 2032. 65 A, B and C v Ireland (n 64).
66 S McGuinness, ‘A, B, and C Leads To D (For Delegation!): A, B and C v. Ireland 25579/05
[2010] ECHR 2032’ (2011) 19 Medical Law Review 476.
67 McGuinness (n 66).
68 McGuinness (n 66). On NHTs and the margin of appreciation, see also Chapters 3 and 13 in
this collection.
69 McGuinness (n 66). 70 McGuinness (n 66) 491.
71 Storrow (n 66). 72 Storrow (n 66) 485.
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donor anonymity, the Department of Health’s own consultation indicated widespread
agreement that more ‘non-identifying’ information about donors should be made
available to donor offspring.73
True, the promotion of the right to know may have shielded the UK Government
from further cases akin to Rose but it has also exacerbated the donor shortage. The latter
risk, moreover, was foreseen: the government knew the potential consequences of
removing anonymity from donors, yet it decided that the child’s right to know should
be championed at any cost, rather than weighed against the competing interests of would-
be parents and donors. Writing in a different context, Murphy and Whitty have argued
that the assessment and management of risk has become a pre-eminent concern for
governments and organizations alike, and that today managing risk involves managing
the ‘risk of rights’.74 Moreover, as they also point out, ‘risks exist in both engaging with,
and rejecting, human rights’.75 In the United Kingdom, promotion of children’s right-to-
know their gamete donor meant rejection of potential ‘right to treatment’ and perhaps
‘right to respect for private and family life’ claims that could be raised by would-be
parents. For example, on what basis does the state strongly encourage disclosure? On
what grounds does the HFEA advise that it is ‘certainly best’ to be open with children
about the circumstances of their conception? Disclosure should be a matter for each
family to decide for itself. But, due to the confidentiality concerns of those who were
considering treatment, such claims were not raised: many would-be parents remained
silent during the policy change. Their voices, therefore, went unheard by public bodies,
like the HFEA, which can only deal with issues through formal and transparent modes of
communication.76 This silence gave the UK Government a great advantage in managing
the ‘conflicting’ interests of would-be parents and donor offspring.
To date the United Kingdom’s non-anonymous donor conception policy does not seem
to have increased openness in families. In spite of the greater encouragement in recent years
for parents to disclose their children’s donor origins, a recent study shows that less than 8
per cent of egg-donation parents, and less than 5 per cent of those who used donor
insemination, disclosed to their children.77 In the near future, management of donor
registers may become another problem. The Coalition Government is planning to abolish
the HFEA and transfer its functions to the Care Quality Commission. There are concerns
as to how effectively the Commission can maintain registers with donors’ information.78
In conclusion, then, the current policy seems to undermine the sustainability of
gamete donation while failing to promote communication within families. It is also
questionable whether the new donor compensation policy will encourage more donors
to come forward. The United Kingdom needs to work towards an inclusive, fully
informed, debate on balancing the right to know one’s genetic identity against a range
of other rights and interests. Without such a debate, and a comprehensive policy
review, more would-be parents will be obliged to seek treatment in jurisdictions
where they forfeit any benefits or protections that the HFE Act would otherwise confer.
73 Turkmendag, Dingwall, and Murphy (n 24).
74 T Murphy and N Whitty, ‘Is Human Rights Prepared? Risks, Rights and Public Health
Emergencies’ (2009) 17 Medical Law Review 219.
75 Murphy and Whitty (n 74) 244.
76 Turkmendag, Dingwall, and Murphy (n 24).
77 S Golombok and others, ‘Non-Genetic and Non-Gestational Parenthood: Consequences for
Parent-child Relationships and the Psychological Well-being of Mothers, Fathers and Children at Age
3’ (2006) 21 Human Reproduction 1918.
78 T Hirsch, ‘NHS Watchdog not Up to Taking on HFEA’s Role’ (Bionews 651, 2012) <www
.bionews.org.uk/page_137301.asp> accessed 23 May 2012.
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